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Foreword 
A game dynamical analysis of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma reveals its complexity 
and unpredictability. Even if one considers only those strategies where the probability for 
cooperation depends on the last move, one finds stable polymorphisms, multiple equili- 
bria, periodic attractors and heteroclinic cycles. 
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Ever since the publication of Axelrod's basic book (1984), the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma 
(IPD) is generally viewed as the major game theoretical paradigm for the evolution of 
co~pera t~ion based on reciprocity. In repeattd encoi~nters, two pla.yers are faced wit 11 1 he 
choice to cooperate or to defect (C or D). If both cooperate, their payoff R (reward) is 
higher than the payoff P (punishment) obtained if both defect. But if one player defects 
while the other cooperates, then the defector's payoff T (temptation) is higher than R, 
while the cooperator's payoff S (sucker) is smaller than B. It is furthermore assumed that 
R > 5(S + T), so that joint cooperation is more profitable than alternating C and D. 
If the game consists of a single encounter, the best option is to defect, no matter what 
the other player does. Since both players will resort to this solution, they end up with 
the punishment instead of the reward. A simple argument shows that the same holds if 
the game consists of a fixed number of encounters (known to both players): one has just 
to apply the previous reasoning to the last move and then to work backward. But if the 
length of the game is unknown, as for example i f  there is a fixed probability w for a further 
encounter, then the players may 'learn' that it is in their interest to cooperate. 
In Axelrod's well known computer tournaments, the simplest strategy did best. This 
was Tit For Tat (TFT), submitted by Anatol Rapaport : it consists of starting with a 
cooperative move and then doing whatever the opponent did on his previous move. Most 
strategies among the 'runner's up' shared with TFT the properties of being nice (i.e. 
starting with C), provokable and forgiving. 
The assessment in Axelrod's contests was established by round robin tournaments. For 
applications to evolution, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) stressed the 'ecological approach' 
and hence the underlying dynamics of the game : each strategy participates to the next 
generation in proportion to its present success. Thus good strategies spread in the pop- 
ulation at the expense of weaker ones, but what is good and what is weak depends on 
the composition of the population and hence varies in time : it may happen, for instance, 
that a strategy does well when rare but poorly when it meets itself too often, so that it 
chokes on its own success. This view of 'frequency dependent fitness values' is at the core 
of Maynard Smith's applications of game theoretical arguments to evolutionary models 
(1982), and in particular of his notions of uninvadable phenotype and evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) .  
In spite of its success, TFT is not an ESS. For sufficiently high w, it cannot be invaded 
by All Defect (ALLD), as Axelrod has shown. But ALLC for example, does as well as 
TFT in a population consisting only of itself and TFT, and hence can spread by genetic 
drift. Once its frequency is sufficiently high, ALLD can take advantage and invade, since 
it has to fear less retaliation than against TFT alone. This argument is due to Selten and 
Hammerstein (1984), who also pointed out another weakness of T F T :  if by mistake, one 
of two TFT-players makes a wrong move, this locks the two opponents into a hopeless 
sequence of alternating D's and C's. 
Such a mistake is unlikely to  occur in a computer tournament, but has to be expected 
in 'real life'. Actual biological situations are fraught with errors and uncertainties. The 
answer to the opponents last move (which may be misperceived in the first place) is only 
an increase or decrease in the readiness to cooperate. This emerges quite clearly from 
Milinski's (1987) experiments on sticklebacks or Lombardo's (1987) data on tree swallows. 
As May (1987) points out, it is important to 'take more account of intrinsic stochasticities 
and of evolutionary stability against representative ensembles of mutant strategies'. 
This suggests considering stochastic strategies given by three parameters (y, p, q), where y 
is the probability to cooperate in the first move, and p and q the conditional probabilities 
to cooperate, given that the adversary's last move was a C or a D. Thus a strategy is 
defined by a triple (y, p, q) E [0, j.I3. For example, ALLC = (1,1,1) or TFT = (1,1,0)  are 
extremal representatives. A p-value of 0.95 can be interpreted as a mixed strategy, or as 
a decision to cooperate after C, subject to an error rate of 0.05 due to incomplete control 
over one's own action. Tit For Two Tats (TFTT, which defects only after two consecutive 
D's from the opponent) is not a member of this class, and neither is a strategy taking 
also account of one's own previous move. Most of the programs submitted to Axelrod's 
tournaments were much more complex. But in spite of their limitations, strategies of type 
(y,p,  q) already display a remarkable variety of interactions. 
There are several candidates for an appropriate evolutionary dynamics, all leading more or 
less to  the same outcome. We shall use here the Ansatz given by Taylor and Jonker (1979): 
the rate of increase of a strategy is the difference between its payoff and the average payoff 
in the population. This game dynamics, which relates well to the theory of evolutionary 
stability, has been studied extensively, e.g. by Zeeman (1980) or by Schuster and Sigmund 



























